Sunday, July 25, 2010

On My Recent Conference Presentation

My Autreat presentation went pretty well, I think. I uploaded the slides to the conference's Yahoo group, if anyone's interested.

Or, alternately, feel free to ask and I'll send them to you.

On the flip side, things have been extraordinarily hectic here. Between an "interesting" (one of my professors has decided that deducting points from my grade for autistic literalism is acceptable behavior), being swamped with schoolwork, and being otherwise preoccupied, I haven't really been able to spare much energy for blogging.

That said, however, I really should have written more. Sorry.

In any case, I just realized that I'd only posted one of the two essays I sent in as supplementary material for my presentation. As such, I'm posting the other:

How does it harm autistics?

Pseudoscientific medicine intended to "cure autism" harms autistics in a wide variety of ways. First and most obviously, the treatments themselves are often harmful. The financial harm to families is often substantial, with many families spending simply absurd amounts of money – some even mortgaging their homes – to pay for "treatments" that can be considered fraudulent at best. Many pseudoscientific treatments require considerable effort to implement while delivering illusory or placebo-equivalent benefit (or even producing harm). Families become emotionally invested in the method, and are often incredibly disappointed when it doesn't work. Sometimes the family avoids this disappointment by seeking out ever deeper and darker depths of woo.

The acceptance of pseudoscientific medicine promotes substandard care due to undertrained practitioners who bypass the relevant licensure requirements. It imposes double-standards on pseudoscientific and scientific practitioners, standards which inevitably favor the pseudoscientists and undermine the constant efforts of scientific practitioners to improve standards of care. It provides false knowledge of how to deal with real problems, and encourages people to ignore, disregard, or remain ignorant of a wide variety of standards of medical and research ethics, and encourages default logic in treatment.

It provides countless confounds to research aimed at helping professionals understand and help autistics and interferes with the conducting of such research, making it harder for genuine scientists to recruit participants.

It encourages the reification of autism, demonizes our neurology, and acts to dehumanize autistics. It promotes a culture of desperation and prevents acceptance of our differences. It legitimatizes the exploitation of us and our neurology by various political groups. It even distracts from real issues and endlessly complicates the discussion on autism.

Perhaps it is more meaningful to ask, "How doesn't pseudoscientific medicine harm autistics?" It would certainly be a far shorter list.

It's worth noting that the list in the presentation itself was longer -- I added several items after I wrote the above. Sometimes "Gyah" doesn't quite cut it.

Thursday, June 17, 2010

On Disease

As I've mentioned before, "disease" is defined: "an impairment of the normal state of the living animal or plant body or one of its parts that interrupts or modifies the performance of the vital functions, is typically manifested by distinguishing signs and symptoms, and is a response to environmental factors (as malnutrition, industrial hazards, or climate), to specific infective agents (as worms, bacteria, or viruses), to inherent defects of the organism (as genetic anomalies), or to combinations of these factors".

This seems rather straightforward, but it's decidedly not the conceptualization most people have of disease. Most people think of "disease" as equivalent to "infectious disease" -- the cold, the flu, and so on. The concept of disease, however, is much more expansive than this, covering such diverse conditions as broken bones, cancers, malnutrition, radiation poisoning, and countless other things.

Any good description of a disease has at least three key elements: etiology, symptomatology, and course. Some other commentators will add a fourth, prognosis, but I consider this a part of the course. Others may disagree, caveat lector, etc.

In other words, diseases are defined by what causes them, how you tell someone has them, and what happens to the people who have them. Many times, each of these factors can be incredibly complex or variable. Often, the lines between them are blurred. Medicine is anything but simple.

Very frequently, we don't know the course of a disease. This is especially true for a while after a disease process has been discovered: until the disease runs its course in someone, we don't know what to expect. For instance, we didn't know that Ebola hemorrhagic fever was fatal until people started dying from it (although, given some of the symptoms, we certainly had reason to suspect!). We know that it's not universally fatal because people have survived.

From here, discussions of the study of diseases' courses and prognoses rapidly get a great deal more complex (with discussions of prognostic factors, modified courses, and the like). While interesting and useful, further discussion really isn't needed to address the core issue of this essay -- which is just what makes something a disease.

While diseases are often grouped together by course in speech, this is almost always through adjectival modifiers (e.g. "fatal disease", "overnight bug", "crippling injury", etc.). Diseases are not defined in terms of their course, and the same disease can have drastically different courses depending on any number of factors (hence the complexity). This is fairly easy to intuitively grasp when illustrated: while some people survive pertussis infection without treatment, others die even with it. Some people recover completely from a simple fracture of the femur; some people never do. Either way, the disease is pertussis or a simple fracture of the femur, respectively.

So -- what about symptomatology? Again, the same illness can have different symptoms in different people (although this effect is less extreme than in the course). It's interesting to note that the symptoms of a disease often can be considered diseases in and of themselves (but they usually aren't thought of that way). Then there's the matter of complications of a disease... which, again, starts making things get really complex, really fast.

While symptomatology plays a huge role in diagnosis, it's not (usually) how we classify disease. Sure, we talk about symptoms a lot ("He has a fever","His stomach hurts", etc.), and we do occasionally group illnesses this way (e.g. chemical, thermal, and radiation burns -- which are grouped together because of large similarities in symptomatology and minor similarities in etiology)... but we mostly group things together in etiology.

In other words, etiology is the "most important" part of a disease -- what defines a disease and separates it from other diseases. Sure, there are diseases of unknown etiology. Keep this in mind for future discussions. It's important.

Sunday, June 13, 2010

For My Upcoming Conference Presentation

The following was written for my upcoming conference presentation on pseudoscientific medicine. It is one of two essays which, collectively, make up my contribution to the conference's program packet. All links within the essay are added for this blog and not in the packet itself.


Throughout society, people are being constantly bombarded with unprecedented amounts of medical information. Unfortunately, much of this information is distorted or wrong… and most people don't have the ability to separate the good from the bad.

It doesn't help that making sense of medical information requires a good deal of expertise. There are entire disciplines of study within medicine dedicated to doing this, and it is quite possible to go to college and get a master's degree or even a Ph.D. in the study of doing so. Some of the most influential doctors in academic medicine today have done exactly this, granting them degrees in such seemingly esoteric disciplines as medical bioinformatics and biostatistics.

Any discussion on all of the ways that things can go wrong and misinformation can arise would need to be absurdly long – it happens in many and myriad ways, and even listing all of them could easily fill an entire book. This presentation is intended to cover one tiny subset of one tiny aspect of one tiny facet of a broader problem: the issue of autism-related pseudoscientific medicine – medicine and medicinal information within the field of autism which pretends to be based on science but actually isn't.

Medicine is commonly defined as the science or practice of the treatment of disease. While this seems fairly straightforward, it actually isn't – the concept of disease is complex, multifaceted, and often controversial. MedLine Plus provides the following definition:
Disease – An impairment of the normal state of the living animal or plant body or one of its parts that interrupts or modifies the performance of the vital functions, is typically manifested by distinguishing signs and symptoms, and is a response to environmental factors (as malnutrition, industrial hazards, or climate), to specific infective agents (as worms, bacteria, or viruses), to inherent defects of the organism (as genetic anomalies), or to combinations of these factors.

In other words, a disease is a harmful dysfunction – a "breakdown" of the body, regardless of its source. A traumatic injury is a disease. Heavy-metal poisoning is a disease (or, more accurately, a type of disease). Polio is a disease. Geneticists can't agree on just what a genetic disease is, but some genetic conditions are indisputably diseases.

As such, medicine is the study – or attempt – of keeping the body from breaking down. Medical views of autism must necessarily look at autism as some form of breakdown of the body: views that do not do this are not medical in nature.

Within scientific medicine, the ideal is to provide information and to practice based on critical evaluation of the sum totality of the available scientific knowledge on any given topic. Unfortunately, this is often not possible or practical in a clinical environment for a variety of reasons… but I have tremendous respect for those doctors who put in an earnest effort towards achieving this lofty goal.

Others simply practice the way they were taught to, or as experts recommend. They may parrot their lessons from back when they were in medical school, or simply repeat what various authorities tell them. This usually yields results which technically work – experts often know what they're talking about and medical schools usually teach effective treatments – but new research is always coming out; new developments occur on a regular basis; new findings constantly change the landscape of medicine; and experts, no matter how revered, are never infallible and are sometimes misunderstood. As such, people who practice this way often have information which is out of date, and are at heightened risk of error.

Some people eschew the framework of science entirely and attempt to heal or prevent illness through other means entirely. Ranging from Christian faith healers to psychics to traditional practitioners of Eastern medical systems, their advice has little to do with what we call "science". These systems range from the relatively harmless to the utterly destructive, from the daughter who prays in church in hopes that her mother will recover from illness to the African witch-doctor who tells desperate seekers of help that AIDS can be cured through sexual intercourse with a child.

And, finally, there is the subject of this presentation: those people who do not practice based on science, but simultaneously pretend to. Whether out of financial interest, political ideology, devout cronyism, or simple ignorance, their advice is usually poor, commonly ineffective, frequently bewildering, often harmful, and collectively stands as an ongoing threat to the lives and welfare of countless people throughout the world.

Welcome to the weird and wonky world of pseudoscientific medicine. For the sake of your health and sanity, you're probably better off if you don't move in.

Saturday, June 12, 2010

Yet Another Example of Over-the-Top Woo

I just discovered that some people are selling levodopa as a dietary supplement.

Yes, levodopa -- arguably the world's most infamous anti-antipsychotic. Yes indeed, legal home psychopharmacology has reached a new low. Just when I think the quacks can't get any more outrageous...

For those of you who don't understand my reaction, levodopa, also known as L-dopa, is a particularly infamous anti-Parkinson's drug and the basis of Dr. Oliver Sacks's well-known book, "Awakenings". It is an extremely potent drug with a host of known side effects which include (but are not limited to):
  • Nausea
  • Gastrointestinal bleeding
  • Disorientation and confusion
  • Auditory and visual hallucinations
  • Drowsiness and narcolepsy
  • A condition which strongly resembles stimulant psychosis
  • Hair loss
  • Emotional effects (it tends to make emotions more "extreme" or "vivid", which wouldn't be such a bad thing if anxiety and libido weren't the aspects most notably/commonly amplified).
  • Cardiac arrhythmia

And then there are the effects of chronic use. This is not a safe drug.

And yet people are selling it as a dietary supplement, completely absent any sort of real regulation. Thank you very much, DHSEA.

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

On Freudian Psychoanalysis

As part of my theories and practice course, we're being asked to summarize the various theories and modalities of therapy by answering a series of questions. We started with classical Freudian psychoanalysis.

The following are the questions and my answers -- somewhat cleaned up.



1-How does the theory conceptualize the basic beliefs about people...does the theory see people as "good", "bad", neutral, capable of growth, proactive or reactive to the environment?

Based solely upon extremely low-quality evidence of dubious validity, Freud believed that we were unaware of the majority of our mind's content and essentially at the mercy of forces beyond our direct perception. As such, Freudian psychoanalysis views people as the deterministic result of conflicts between postulated and reified constructs that exist within a non-falsifiable system. To the extent that people are able to grow within this context, it is the result of the client coming to exert control over these constructs and derivative reified "forces".


2-How does the theory describe the function of personality..what is the purpose of our "personality"; what needs does the personality meet..?

In essence, the ego serves to regulate forces/instincts, to manage anxiety, to plan, and to maintain reality focus.


3-How does the theory describe the "structure" of personality -- what IS our personality; what does it consist of?

In essence, Freud believed that the "self" (ego) serves to mediate between a person's "higher" desires (superego) and "lower" desires (id). As such, one's personality is determined by one's ability to balance and control these often-reified constructs and resulting also-reified "forces".



4-How does the theory describe how we develop into a "normal person"?

Freud believed that there was one true course of development (all departures necessarily being harmful) which could be described as going through a series of "psychosexual stages". Specifically, one passes (or should pass) through the oral stage during infancy, the anal stage during early childhood, the phallic stage during preschool, the latency stage during early school-age, and the genital stage during adolescence and onward. The oral stage accounts for the ability to delay gratification and to trust others. The anal stage accounts for independence, the ability to manage and express negative emotions, and acceptance of personal power. The phallic stage accounts for sexuality. The latency stage accounts for socialization and the ability to form relationships. The genital stage, once reached, accounts for all post-adolescent development.


5-How does the theory describe how we develop into "abnormal" people?

If one is derailed from this one true path of healthy development, one develops a number of problems (which may or may not actually be problems). These include (but are not limited to) mistrust and rejection of others, an inability to form intimate relationships, obsession over rules, a lack of appropriate sexuality, and a lack of relationships.



6-How does the theory conceptualize the process of counseling? How does it work, in general?

Freud believes that one developed in therapy by coming to understand and believe in the existence of constructs of questionable validity (except, perhaps, as a metaphor) which describe phenomena which probably can't be appropriately generalized to them, as well as developing control over these phenomena ("achieving insight" or "strengthening the ego", respectively).



7-How does the theory conceptualize the specific techniques of counseling?

Generally speaking, the techniques of psychoanalysis include maintaining a consistent analytic framework and a reliable therapeutic environment, engaging in free association (i.e. having the client talk about whatever (s)he wants without inhibition) in order to allow the therapist to make logical leaps regarding what is within the client's questionably existent unconscious (i.e. interpretations) and to teach the client to accept these conclusions as real, engaging in possibly inaccurate analysis of the content of dreams for meaning which may or may not actually exist in order to teach the client to accept the conclusions of these analyses as accurate, helping the client to overcome any resistance to the acceptance of the therapist's view of who the client is and what the client's problems are, and engaging in possibly-inaccurate analysis of the feelings the client develops towards the therapist during this process (analysis and interpretation of transference).



8-How does the theory conceptualize the roles/responsibilities of the counselor?

Classical psychoanalysis views therapists as "blank screens" for clients to project their feelings for past individuals onto. If the therapist maintains a neutral demeanor and does not engage in self-disclosure, any feelings the client develops toward the therapist are largely assumed to be the client projecting feelings for other people onto the therapist. Additionally, the therapist must listen closely to the client as (s)he free-associates, analyze what is said, and occasionally make interpretations of what (s)he hears, teaching the client to accept the existence of the various constructs created by Freudian theory and to assign causal attribution for feelings and beliefs in a manner consistent with Freudian theory. By aligning the client's view of his self with the therapist's frame of reference and beliefs in Freudian theory, "progress" is achieved.



9-How does the theory conceptualize the roles/responsibilities of the client?

Generally speaking, the responsibilities of the client in a Freudian framework are to cooperate with he therapist as he engages in his responsibilities, to attempt to overcome resistance to his or her acceptance of the therapist's view of who the client is, and to help the therapist develop such a view based on analyses of dubious reliability and validity.



10-What is the utility of the theory...strengths, weaknesses, limitation, applicability?

While our text discusses a number of comparatively minor limitations, these are largely secondary to the lack of empirical validation for large portions of psychoanalytic theory, the non-falsifiable (and thus unscientific) nature of the psychoanalytic framework, the lack of adequate empirical validation of the benefits of therapy (I am unaware of even a single well-controlled RCT which shows a beneficial effect for Freudian psychoanalysis relative to simply having someone to talk to), the focus on teaching the client to accept the analyst's questionable analyses as accurate, the (occasionally realized) potential for severe harm due to this emphasis, and vague criteria for termination of therapy which require therapist/client agreement (and therefore are subject to the various financial disincentives for the termination of a therapist/client relationship).

In terms of strengths, psychoanalysis recognizes the possibility of bias due to a limited set of factors (e.g. countertransference, racial stereotypes) and attempts to teach therapists to counter these. It emphasizes the necessity of a therapist recognizing and accepting who he or she is, recognizes humans as individuals, and emphasizes the importance of understanding the client and the client's problems, and teaches about the importance of a person's history in determining their present. Additionally, it was chronologically the first of the major therapeutic modalities and many of its techniques have contributed to their development.

Also, the couch can be relaxing.

Friday, May 7, 2010

A Recent Assignment

My abnormal psychology class has assigned "critical thinking exercises". In practical terms, this means weekly essays on some topic or another. The first one, which I just turned in, was a response to the question: "What do you feel are the most salient and valid criteria of abnormality? Why?"

While posting this essay, I found several typographical errors that I somehow managed to miss while proofreading it for submission. I've corrected them and added some HTML links to provide explanation and further reference. This said, my essay is as follows:


This is a pretty difficult question for me to answer, mostly because I believe the question itself is both flawed and loaded. To begin with, our textbook grossly misuses the term "abnormal", equating abnormality with dysfunction and defining the term "abnormal behavior" as synonymous with the concept of a psychological disorder (cf. p. 2). In actuality, however, the term "abnormal" simply means "not normal" and is synonymous with the term "atypical". As such, any behavior which differs from the norm is abnormal… and atypicality is the only criterion with any relevance.

While it is possible to argue that our book uses "abnormal" and its derivatives in a special sense, the use of this term in such a fashion is a gross violation of both medial bioethics and clinical ethics in general. Specifically, it violates both the principles of benevolence and non-maleficence through its effects both on informed persons who accept this equation (i.e. students learning from the book) and the effects of regarding this sort of linguistic equivocation as acceptable on society as a whole.

I certainly do not believe in linguistic determinism, but it is very difficult to deny the existence of a relationship between language and thought. How we think affects the sort of language we use, and there is a good bit of evidence that the sort of language we use effects the way we think (e.g. Tan et al., 2008). The existence of several named logical fallacies related to this (e.g. equivocation, amphiboly, fallacy by semantic shift) tends to support this general idea. Given the state of the knowledge in this arena and the precautionary principle, there is an ethical obligation to avoid this sort of issue.

Moreover, there is the matter of laypersons who hear discussions using this sort of misused terminology. It is unlikely that such persons will be aware of the issues surrounding the constructions used, and we live in an era in which the technical literature is becoming increasingly available to such people (as evidenced by publications such as PLoS and the policies of PubMed Central).

Even if the issue of the false equivalency created by this abuse of the English language is ignored, the criteria laid out in the book are problematic on other grounds. Simply put, they have been used to justify outright bigotry and abusive "treatments" which were only "justified" by this bigotry (e.g. Cartwright, 1851; Lovaas, 1987; O'Malley, 1914; Rekers & Lovaas, 1974; Chapter 14 of our book). The use of our book's criteria as sole and sufficient demarcation for what is and isn't a mental disorder is flawed, highly unethical, and not what is actually done in practice.

Furthermore, the entire construct of "mental illness" is of dubious validity and has been extensively challenged (e.g. Szasz, 2008). Even if we can't demonstrate that mental illness objectively exists, however, there remains one potential justification for the use of the concept: utility.

Simply put, we can justify describing something as a mental illness if we can demonstrate that the concept – and the medical-model approach which goes along with it – is useful. Doing so in a clinical environment, however, would require a demonstration of improved patient outcome, and it is very difficult to conduct a rigorous randomized controlled trial of the use of a concept.

Despite this, it is possible to evaluate the consequences of medicalization via the epidemiological evidence and comparing the prognosis of various syndromes in countries that have widespread access to medical treatment for mental illness and those that do not. It is also possible to do this by comparing outcomes across time-periods in a similar fashion.

Scizophrenia is the most "extreme" of the DSM mental disorders, and it is a major mainstay of psychiatry. As such, it makes intuitive sense to begin by evaluating the utility of the concept of a psychological disorder in reference to schizophrenia. Moreover, there exists a single randomized, controlled trial of psychiatry as a whole in the treatment of schizophrenia: the Soteria Project.

None of these approaches yield evidence in favor of the utility of a medical model approach to schizophrenia: World Health Organization data indicates that schizophrenia has better prognosis in developing countries than in developed countries; the best outcomes to be found for the treatment of schizophrenia here in America can be found in those non-medically treated by Quakers in the 19th century; and the findings of the Soteria Project were very much damning in regards to the effects of psychiatric intervention (see Whitaker, 2002 for review).

Or, in other words, the concept has yet to demonstrate utility in regards to treatment. If and when it does, I'll start to consider medical-model approaches ethically justified.

References

Cartwright, S. (1851). Report on the diseases and physical peculiarities of the negro race. New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, 7, 691-715.

Lovaas, O. (1987). Behavioral treatment and normal educational and intellectual functioning in young autistic children. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55, 3-9.

O'Malley, M. (1914). Psychoses in the colored race. American Journal of Insanity, 71, 309-337.

Rekers, G. & Lovaas, O. (1974). Behavioral treatment of deviant sex-role behaviors in a male child. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 7, 173-190.

Szasz, T. (2008). Psychiatry: The Science of Lies. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Tan, L., Chan, A., Kay, P., Khong, P., Yip, L., & Luke, K. (2008). Language affects patterns of brain activation associated with perceptual decision. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105, 4004-4009.

Whitaker, R. (2002). Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the Enduring Mistreatment of the Mentally Ill. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing.

Edit: Corrected one more typo...

A Few Changes

Classes have started up again, and I am now once again a grad student. My blog's byline has been altered back to its original to reflect this. Expect a bit more free-ranging commentary from me, as I once again use my various coursework as inspiration for blog posts.

Also, due to some recent events in the online autistic community, I'm preemptively adding a policy against personal attacks in the comments here.